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STORIES OF ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POSSIBILITIES 
Milner S. Ball* 
Robert Cover once observed how "[n]o set of legal institutions or 
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it 
meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a 
scripture."1 Stories of origin locate law, invest it with legitimacy, and 
so lend it stability. As Cover went on to note, however, the narratives 
that legitimate a legal order also retain revolutionary force, for a re-
turn to the originating acts recounted in the narratives is always possi-
ble. 2 A polity begun in revolution remains subject to revolution. 
There is an American story of origins. It is a good story. And a 
useful one.3 It legitimates the Constitution and gives it meaning. It 
supports the authority of the republic and helps to secure the founda-
* Caldwell Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 
1958, Princeton University; S.T.B. 1961, Harvard University; J.D. 1971, University of Georgia. 
- Ed. I am deeply indebted to a number of colleagues for their critical attention to an earlier 
version of this Article: William McFeely, Judith Resnik, Aviam Soifer, Joseph Vining, and Rob-
ert Williams. I am equally indebted to the editors, co-authors, and faculty, especially David 
Chambers, who participated in the Michigan Law Review's singular, fruitful gathering at Ann 
Arbor. Another version of this piece was presented as a University of Georgia Humanities 
Center lecture, and the attendees' criticisms were both welcome and very helpful. 
1. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1983) (footnote omitted). The dependence of law upon narrative has at times been 
hidden from attention under attempts to expound law as an autonomous, rational system com· 
posed of rules or principles. The scholarship of James Boyd White has been instrumental in 
reintroducing the relation of law and narrative to contemporary legal studies. See, e.g., J.B. 
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985). We 
may now get on with the business of exploring the relation without having to argue its legal· 
academic legitimacy. In taking up the issue here, I return to a subject that has taken on a 
different appearance in the meantime. See M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW 16-28 
(1981). 
2. Cover, supra note 1, at 23-24. The Book of Deuteronomy provides a prime example: 
When your son asks you in time to come, "What is the meaning of the testimonies and 
the statutes and the ordinances which the Lord our God has commanded you?" then you 
shall say to your son, "We were Pharaoh's slaves in Egypt and the Lord brought us out of 
Egypt with a mighty hand ... that he might bring us in and give us the land which he swore 
to give to our fathers. 
Deuteronomy 6:20-23 (Revised Standard Version). 
3. It is not necessary to assume that there is an American story of origins, but for the sake of 
the experiment, I do count on readers suspending disbelief in the possibility that there is such a 
story and that it is related to constitutional law. 
If heresy typically detaches some element of orthodoxy and invests it, in isolation, with exclu-
sive importance, then insistence upon interpreting the Constitution according to its Framers' 
intent is a heretical offshoot of the American civil religion. It takes a part of the story of found· 
ing and inflates it. Heresy in general bears witness to orthodoxy, and this one may be some 
evidence of the existence and content of an orthodox story of origins. 
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tions. It has alsq proved, at times, wonderfully transformative, help-
ing to augment the foundations and expand the legal order to embrace 
those who were formerly excluded.4 There is abundant reason to cele-
brate the story of the founding, to retell and employ it, and to affirm it 
and its regenerative as well as conservative powers. 
And yet the story of origins also has a very different potential. It 
has proved to be sometimes incapacious, a rhetorical mode for closure 
and resistance to inclusiveness. While the struggle to gain equality for 
black people may be a prime instance of the transformative effect of 
the story, the continuing practice of violence against Indian tribes is a 
critical instance of its destructive effect. 5 The story is a good one, but 
bound up with and inseparable from its goodness and success, it has 
also served aggression and exclusivity. 
Can we both affirm the American story - employing it trans-
formatively to include the excluded; enjoying, retelling, participating 
in, applauding, and shaping it - and at the same time disaffirm it, 
rejecting its capacity to do harm? 
Hannah Arendt ventured the judgment that the authority of the 
American republic and its law "will be safe and intact as long as the 
act itself, the beginning as such, is remembered whenever constitu-
tional questions in the narrower sense of the word come into play."6 
Perhaps her conjecture was incomplete. Perhaps the safety of the re-
public's authority requires more than remembering the story of the 
founding when constitutional questions come into play. 
Perhaps, as a minimum, that story requires supplementation, re-
quires that it take a place alongside other stories of origin, requires 
that we acknowledge the validity of other constitutive narratives. By 
redirecting us away from monopolistic absolutes and certainties and 
toward appreciation of other human, political possibilities, multiple 
stories might help to alleviate and even reconfigure the dilemma of 
simultaneous affirmation and disaffirmation of the American story of 
origins. 
The story's power to legitimate and regenerate the republic is lim-
ited because it is not, finally, transcendent or transcending. It may 
transform, but it cannot transfigure. No story can. Essential and 
powerful though it is, narrative is not of itself redemptive. Perhaps, 
then, something more is necessary than narrative alone, something 
more than the American story even when told together with others. 
4. I confine my comments to rhetoric but do not make the mistake of thinking that rhetoric 
alone is an engine of change. 
5. These two examples are elaborated in later sections of this Article. 
6. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 205 (1965). 
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I. THE STORY 
A. Douglass, Lincoln, and the Declaration of Independence 
Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth, on this conti-
nent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposi-
tion that all men are created equal. 
-Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
-Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence 
As a starter, the American story of origins may be said to consist 
in the people, documents, and acts that we bundle loosely together and 
designate as cause for celebration on the Fourth of July. It is typically 
anchored in the Declaration of Independence (understood to be as 
much event as text). That this is so, that we accept the telling of the 
American story as beginning this way, is an achievement - as much 
of one as the events and commitments recounted. It is the achieve-
ment of many people, including Frederick Douglass and Abraham 
Lincoln. 
Douglass broke with the Garrisonians when he concluded that the 
dissolution of the Union they sought would allow slavery to continue 
unimpeded in the southern states. 7 He then confronted a political-
rhetorical problem. Because abolition required the Union, he would 
have to affirm the Constitution. To affirm the Constitution, he would 
have to construe it as an anti-slavery document. To do that, he would 
have to tell the (or an) American story as one that included black 
people. The transforming change of abolition would have to be tied to 
the foundations. He would have to find a language that would register 
with his audience and allow him both to affirm and disaffirm the facts. 
The Declaration of Independence was a means to this end. It al-
lowed Douglass to characterize the black freedom movement as plac-
ing no "new consideration upon the public" and as no more than an 
"endeavor to carry out the great fundamental principles of American 
govemment."8 
The American story was the specific object of attention in 
7. 3 F. DOUGLASS, THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 174, 365 (J. Blassingame ed. 1985); 
F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 260-61 (1962). 
My reading of Douglass shares much with that of Professor Mari Matsuda. See Matsuda, 
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 
(1987). 
8. F. DOUGLASS, We Ask Only for Our Rights: An Address Delivered in Troy, New York, on 4 
September 1855, in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 7, at 91, 91-92 (the partic-
ular object under protest was New York's $250 property qualification for black voters). 
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Douglass' famous speech of 1852, What to the Slave Is the Fourth of 
July? 9 As he noted, the times demanded irony. 10 Accordingly, he 
applauded the Fourth of July story: "the great deeds of your fa-
thers,"11 the American work of freedom, and the Declaration, with its 
"saving principles."12 But then he juxtaposed the story of slaves in the 
United States: next to the Declaration's words on equality he placed 
the fact that Americans held "in ... bondage ... a seventh part of the 
inhabitants of your country."13 
The irony had an appeal. Douglass' conclusion that "[t]his Fourth 
[of] July is yours, not mine" 14 was a plea to make it his as well, a plea 
to render the story capable of embracing him. The Declaration pro-
vided both encouragement to do so and a means for reading the Con-
stitution as supporting the effort. 15 
It was not always so. Chief Justice Taney's account of our history 
in his Dred Scott 16 opinion of 1857, five years after Douglass' Fourth 
of July address, is a reminder of the availability of competing versions 
better grounded in popular regard and in the facts of the day. In writ-
ing for the Court, Taney kept circling back to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. He cited it ten times. After quoting the Declaration's first 
two sentences, he observed that they "would seem to embrace the 
whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at 
9. F. DOUGLASS, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? An Address Delivered in Rochester, 
New York, on 5July1852, in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 7, at 359 (1982) 
[Hereinafter F. DOUGLASS, What to the Slave is the Fourth of Jury?]. Compare Douglass' 1852 
speech with his July Fourth address of 10 years later. F. DOUGLASS, The Slaveholders' Rebel-
lion: An Address Delivered-in Himrod's, New York, on 4 Ju{y 1862, in 3 THE FREDERICK 
DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 7, at 521. It was given a more modern ring, perhaps, by the fact 
that "[l]ocal young people supplemented the program by playing rousing band music." Id. In 
this later speech, he said the "downward career of the Republic ... began by bartering away an 
eternal principle of right for present peace." Id. at 530. 
10. F. DOUGLASS, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?, supra note 9, at 371. 
11. Id. at 366. 
12. Id. at 364. The Declaration, he added, was the "RING-BOLT to the chain of your 
nation's destiny." Id. at 363. 
Douglass asked: 
Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice, embodied in the Declara-
tion of Independence, extended to us? [A]nd am I, therefore, called upon to bring our 
humble offering to the national altar, and to confess the benefits and express devout grati-
tude for the blessings resulting from your independence to us? 
Id. at 367. 
13. Id. at 383 (emphasis in original). 
14. Id. at 368. 
15. Id. at 384-87. For specific use of the Declaration in interpreting the Constitution, and for 
Douglass' constitutional hermeneutics, see F. DOUGLASS, The Dred Scott Decision: An Address 
Delivered, in Part, in New York, New York, in May 1857, in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS 
PAPERS, supra note 7, at 163, 176-83; F. DOUGLASS, The American Constitution and the Slave: 
An Address Delivered in Glasgow, Scot/and, on 26 March 1860, in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS 
PAPERS, supra note 7, at 340, 350-66. 
16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406-27 (1857). 
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this day would be so understood."17 In spite of this enlarged contem-
porary understanding, however, neither the language nor the nation 
were to be enlarged with it. 
Taney explained: If the language of the Declaration had been in-
tended to embrace slaves, then "the conduct of the distinguished men 
who framed [it] would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent 
with the principles they asserted." 18 But "the men who framed this 
declaration were great men - high in literary acquirements . . . and 
incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they 
were acting." 19 It must be that "the language," as understood in that 
day and as "used" by those honorable men, could not "be supposed to 
embrace the negro race."20 Since it would be "inadmissible in any 
tribunal called on to interpret it" to argue that the words of the Con-
stitution or Declaration should be given "a more liberal construction 
in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument 
was framed and adopted,"21 black people could not be numbered 
among the "all men" created equal. 
Notwithstanding the combined force of the readings of Taney on 
the right and of Douglass' former ally Garrison on the left, Douglass 
clung to the need for Union and an antislavery reading of the Consti-
tution and therefore also to his version of the American story.22 
Irony, however, would have to give way to metaphor. He returned to 
the story of origins: "The Constitution, as well as the Declaration of 
Independence, and the sentiments of the founders of the Republic, 
give us a platform broad enough, and strong enough, to support the 
most comprehensive plans for the freedom and elevation of all the peo-
ple of this country."23 On that platform, the Constitution, which 
never employs the word "slavery," could be interpreted as antislavery, 
and the continuation of slavery could be interpreted as a discrepancy 
between the Constitution as written and the Constitution as 
administered.24 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address of 1863 may have helped as much as 
17. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410. 
18. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410. 
19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410. 
20. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410. 
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426. 
22. See F. DOUGLASS, The Dred Scott Decision: An Address Delivered, in Part, in New York, 
New York. in May 1857, supra note 15. "[N]o thanks to the slaveholding wing of the Supreme 
Court," he said, "my hopes were never brighter than now." Id. at 167. 
23. Id. at 171-72. 
24. Id. at 182; see also F. DOUGLASS, Eulogy of William Jay: An Address Delivered in New 
York, New York. on 12 May 1859, in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 7, at 
249, 275-76 (Taney's citation to the authority of the slaveholding practices of the Framers was an 
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anything to make the Douglass-like version of the American story ca-
nonical. Lincoln's opening, "Fourscore and seven years ago" - a 
type of "once upon a time" - was a reference not to 1789 and the 
adoption of the Constitution, but to 1776 and the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. 25 In that beginning the nation had been dedicated to the 
"proposition" about equality.26 
If Douglass' initial method was ironic, Lincoln's was midrashic. 
Where Douglass drew out the story of origins by contrasting it with 
the story of slavery, Lincoln interpreted the story of origins through 
compatible narrative extension. He interpreted the story of bringing 
forth the nation by embroidering it with the story of the war for that 
nation's life. The methods of both men were means for engaging nar-
rative in the transformation of the legal order, telling stories so that 
law might include and respect the black people who had been 
excluded. 
Because the inclusive, egalitarian version of the story has gained 
purchase, Douglass' enterprise and Lincoln's vision do not now seem 
quixotic. The fourteenth amendment appears to have belonged in the 
Constitution all along, the Constitution appears to have grown out of 
the Declaration of Independence, and the Declaration appears to have 
emerged from a constitutive devotion to equality. Indeed, this version, 
drawn out of the Declaration, is the accepted, even mandatory, rhetor-
ical starting point for attempts to achieve a legally protected place for 
the discrete and insular and the oppressed. 
B. Contemporary Habit 
With greater or lesser political as well as stylistic success, the 
Douglass-Lincoln versions of the American story of origins continue 
to be told in time of need when consensus must be rallied around 
change. In 1965, for example, Lyndon Johnson's appeal on behalf of 
the voting rights bill was cast as a version of the story: 
attempt to make "[t]heir anti-slavery declarations ... less potent for good than their pro-slavery 
examples have been made for evil."). 
25. Address by Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 
AN AMERICAN PRIMER 435, 436 (D. Boorstin ed. 1968). 
26. Matthew Arnold's sense of style reportedly caused him to quit reading when he came to 
the phrase about dedication to a proposition. See Adler & Gorman, Reflections: The Gettysburg 
Address, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 8, 1975, at 42-43. "In traditional logic, a proposition is a 
sentence setting forth something judged ('held') to be either true or false. In the first line of the 
second paragraph of the Declaration, that men are equal is held to be true and so is declared in a 
proposition." Id. at 43. Wilbur Samuel Howell traces the form of the Declaration and the term 
"self-evident" to Duncan's Logick Howell, New Insight into Declaration of Independence, 
Princeton Alumni Weekly, Dec. 9, 1975, at 8, 10. Lincoln's logic may reflect Jefferson's logic 
which reflects Duncan's logic. 
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At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to 
shape a turning point in man's unending search for freedom. So it was at 
Lexington and Concord. So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So it 
was last week in Selma, Alabama. 
This was the first nation in the history of the world to be founded 
with a purpose. The great phrases of that purpose still sound in every 
American heart, North and South: "All men are created equal" .... 
Those are not just clever words. Those are not just empty theories. In 
their name Americans have fought for two centuries .... 
Those words are a promise to every citizen that he shall share in the 
dignity of man. 27 
Another instance of this version is Justice Brennan's opinion con-
curring and dissenting in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke: 28 
Our Nation was founded on the principle that "all Men are created 
equal." Yet candor requires acknowledgement that the Framers of our 
Constitution, to forge the 13 Colonies into one Nation, openly compro-
mised this principle of equality with its antithesis: slavery .... [I]t is well 
to recount how recent the time has been, if it has yet to come, when the 
promise of our principles has flowered into the actuality of equal oppor-
tunity for all regardless of race or color. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, the embodiment in the Constitution of 
our abiding belief in human equality, has been the law of our land for 
only slightly more than half its 200 years. And for half of that half, the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment was largely moribund so 
that, as late as 1927, Mr. Justice Holmes could sum up the importance of 
that Clause by remarking that it was the "last resort of constitutional 
arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).29 
27. Address on Voting Rights by Lyndon B. Johnson, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 15, 1965) 
reprinted in AN AMERICAN PRIMER, supra note 25, at 944, 94647. 
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
29. 438 U.S. at 326. It has been argued that "a continuous yet vital constitutional tradition 
... has required the Supreme Court to interpret relevant constitutional text in terms of abstract 
background rights." Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 543 
(1985). Brennan's opinion illustrates how it is the story of beginning and not abstract back-
ground rights that is the source of continuity and vitality. 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), is illustrative ofa version of the 
story crabbed in substance and crabbed in the telling: 
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for 
rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" 
for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where 
race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of 
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs. "Courts 
would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by 
various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary 
level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications .... " We think 
such a result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision 
whose central command is equality. 
109 S. Ct. at 727 (citations omitted) (O'Connor, J.). Brennan's story is about the little engine 
that could; O'Connor's in Croson is about the little engine that can't. 
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That the Declaration/equality version has become standard de-
spite its initial implausibility is a remonstrance against too early or too 
easy concession to counter-realities, including the reality of Supreme 
Court majorities. What now have we earned a right to say is impossi-
ble for the American story? What transforming tale of American ori-
gins cannot be told in successful aid of legal place for the dissentient 
and the disestablished? 
Charles Black encourages us to believe that the story is available 
for a judicially cognizable, constitutional right protecting the poor. 
Ringing a change on the classic narrative strategy, he tells a version of 
the story that fixes upon the Declaration's proposition about a right to 
the pursuit of happiness. This tale of an American right to livelihood 
is, he says, "talking into the political wind." But, he adds, "winds 
change."30 
He advises that "hypocrisy may commit itself beyond easy retrac-
tion. "31 Or, hypocrisy may prove to have been commitment; nations, 
like persons, may not know their minds all at once. "[T]he Declara-
tion of Independence is still here," Black concludes. "Later genera-
tions, yours and mine and others to come, have much work to do, if 
we, and those who follow us, choose to change all the assertions in the 
second sentence of the Declaration from hypocrisy to commitment."32 
If there is a version of the American story of origins that widens 
the embrace of the legal order to include blacks and the poor, then it 
may appear potentially omnicompetent, limited only by the stamina 
and imagination of the storytellers and their ability to shape the story 
of origins so that their particular stories can be aligned with it. 33 I 
think that the story is not omnicompetent. But before I address its 
limits and harmfulness, I must first elaborate the nature of its benefi-
cial power. 
30. Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
1103, 1115 (1986). 
31. Id. at 1103. 
32. Id. 
33. There remain the problems, not discussed here, of how to relate particular stories, how to 
work them into the story of origins, and how to get them before the courts. For an instructive 
account of a success, see the story about stories and judges willing to listen to them in Wizner, 
Passion in Legal Argument and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Comment on Goldberg v. Kelly, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 179 (1988). On some of the difficulties, see, e.g., Schneider, Dunlap, Lavery 
& Gregory, Workshop: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminists at the Bar- Translating Personal Experi-
ence into Effective Legal Argument, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107 (1988). 
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II. NARRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNITY: 
POLYPHONY 
A. Polyphony 
The alliance that the story of origins offers to law is especially fit 
for the United States because of the sympathy between narrative and 
democracy. In contrast to the language of command, which is hierar-
chical and distancing and therefore unsuitable to democracy, narrative 
is inherently communal. A story is shared. It establishes a relation of 
mutuality between narrator and hearer. When it works, the audience 
becomes a participant in the performance.34 So, when it is granted, 
does the entreaty "Tell me a story" establish a type of equality be-
tween child and adult - the equality of mutual participation in a joint 
enterprise. A story may also breach the barrier of time between the 
present audience and the past participants in the events narrated. In 
the Deuteronomic example,35 it is "we" who are preserved alive "as at 
this day." In the American story, it is said that citizens exchanged 
promises and decided together how they should govern themselves.36 
To be at the beginning was to embark on a joint venture. To tell and 
to hear the story of it is also to engage in a joint enterprise. To this 
extent, the story does what it says. 
In addition to this sympathy between participatory narrative me-
dium and democratic political reality - the equality in each - there 
is a closer, more complex affinity - the capacity of each for multiple, 
independent voices, le., polyphony. I use the term "polyphony" here 
in the sense given it by Mikhail Bakhtin, as a description of Dostoev-
sky's novels in particular, but also of narrative and of the dialogic na-
ture of language and life in general. 37 
34. The conclusion of Aeschylus' Oresteian trilogy gave way to the Panathenaic procession 
which was led by a company of aliens and which thus embodied the last play's image of Athens 
as a home for strangers. There was interaction between play, procession, and politics. The audi-
ence participation and effect I refer to in the text is not usually or necessarily so obvious and 
physical. 
35. See supra note 2. 
36. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. l, at 3 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (establishing govern-
ment from reflection and choice, not accident and force). 
37. At different times, Bakhtin employed different terms in exploring the phenomenon: din· 
logue, heteroglossia, and carnivnlization. See, e.g., Holquist, Introduction, in M. BAKHTIN, THE 
DIALOGJC IMAGINATION xix (M. Holquist trans. 1981); Holquist, The Carnival of Discourse: 
Baxtin and Simultaneity, CANADIAN REV. COMP. LIT., June 1985, at 220, 221-22. 
Bakhtin did not limit polyphony to Dostoevsky or to novels. He assigned "the term 'novel' to 
whatever form of expression within a given literary system reveals the limits of that system as 
inadequate, imposed, or arbitrary. Literary systems are composed of canons, and the novel is 
fundamentally anticanonical. It does not permit generic monologue." K. CLARK & M. HOL-
QUIST, MIKHAIL BAKHTIN 276 (1984). 
In this sense, the novel may be thought of 
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Bakhtin believed Dostoevsky's singular achievement was his reali-
zation of narrative's capacity for a plurality of consciousnesses, voices, 
and languages: "A character's word about himself and his world is 
just as fully weighted as the author's." Each voice and language is 
fully independent - "it sounds, as it were, alongside the author's 
word" - but also "in a special way combines both with [the author's 
word] and with the full and equally valid voices of other characters."38 
The characters fogether with the author are equally independent and 
engaged in dialogue.39 The whole is polyphonic. 
As an affirmation of and engagement with others, their voices, con-
sciousnesses, and autonomy, polyphony is an ethical-political as well 
as aesthetic achievement. Dostoevsky's characters must overcome 
their "solipsism, their disunited 'idealistic' consciousnesses" and 
thereby "transform the other person from a shadow into an authentic 
reality."40 This action within the work of art, existing between the 
covers of the book and taking place among characters and author, also 
has affective extension externally. It engages its audience in the dia-
logue. There is no nonparticipating viewer of events in the narrative 
and no nonparticipating reader of it.41 
not as some formalists would do ... but rather as a tendency or possibility in literature ... . 
What we seek is a representation, at whatever time or place and in whatever genre ... . 
Only "the novel," with its supreme realization of the potentialities inherent in prose, offers 
the possibility of doing justice to voices other than the author's own, and only the novel 
invites us to do so .... It is ... a matter of the technical resources of narrative in prose -
the inherent capacity of narrative to incorporate languages other than the author's (or 
reader's) own. 
Booth, Introduction, in M. BAKHTlN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS xxii (C. Emerson 
ed./trans. 1984). 
38. M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS, supra note 37, at 7. 
39. There is one set of values that I apply by myself to myself and another that I apply to 
all the others that are not me. They in turn make the same distinction between themselves 
and others. In the gap between the two value systems is the space where dialogue is pursued 
at its deepest level. 
K. CLARK & M. HOLQUIST, supra note 37, at 242. 
Language is dialogic by nature and from the beginning: "Only the mythical Adam, who 
approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could really have 
escaped from start to finish [the] dialogical inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in 
the object." M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 37, at 279. "Forming itself 
in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which 
has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word." Id. at 
280. 
40. M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS, supra note 37, at 10. One "may 
relate as a despot to others, that is, completely monologically, or ... may relate to them demo-
cratically, that is, polyphonically or dialogically. Bakhtin's concern for how authors relate to 
their characters, then, is not merely a concern for the formal properties of point of view but also 
a way to flesh out possibilities of self/other relations." K. CLARK & M. HOLQUIST, supra note 
37, at 242-43. 
41. Indeed, to live is to be a participant in life's polyphony: 
[T]o portray the inner man, as Dostoevsky understood it, was possible only by portraying 
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For this reason, "the work of art is never finished"42 but "is always 
a relationship ... [that] acquires wholeness only when an individual 
assumes a concrete attitude toward it."43 Reading, as relationship, en-
gages the thought, action, ethics - the person - of the reader, as 
Bakhtin himself demonstrated. Against the Soviet drive toward a total 
state - toward the apophantic, monologic, monophonic - Bakhtin, 
the reader of Dostoevsky, became an advocate of polyphony. When, 
at the conclusion of his book on Dostoevsky, he exhorted his own 
readers "to renounce their old monologic habits, his gesture [was] a 
commentary on a political situation which increasingly permitted only 
a single authoritative voice to be heard and which sent those such as 
Bakhtin himself, who could not be monologized, into exile."44 
Polyphony in narrative is the representation "of human 'lan-
guages' or 'voices' that are not reduced into, or suppressed by, a single 
authoritative voice: a representation of the inescapably dialogical 
quality of human life at its best. "45 This affective representational ca-
pacity accounts for the fundamental sympathetic relation between the 
aesthetics of narrative and the dynamics of the American legal order. 
his communion with another. Only in communion, in the interaction of one person with 
another, can the "man in man" be revealed, for others as well as for oneself. 
It is fully understandable that at the center of Dostoevsky's artistic world must lie dia-
logue, and dialogue not as a means but as an end in itself. Dialogue here is not the threshold 
to action, it is the action itself. It is not a means for revealing, for bringing to the surface the 
already ready-made character of a person; no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself 
outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is - and, we repeat, not only for 
others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. 
M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS, supra note 37, at 252. 
42. K. CLARK & M. HOLQUIST, supra note 37, at 243. 
43. Emerson, Editor's Preface to M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS, 
supra note 37, at xxxix (emphasis in original). 
44. K. CLARK & M. HOLQUIST, supra note 37, at 252. 
What Bakhtin had written was: "We must renounce our monologic habits so that we might 
come to feel at home in the new artistic sphere which Dostoevsky discovered, so that we might 
orient ourselves in that incomparably more complex artistic model of the world which he cre-
ated." M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS, supra note 37, at 272. 
The work that realizes polyphony 
insists on a dialogue between texts that a given system admits as literature and those texts 
that are excluded from such a definition. The novel is a kind of epistemological outlaw, a 
Robin Hood of texts. Because the fundamental features of any culture are inscribed in its 
texts, not only in its literary texts but in its legal and religious ones as well, "novelness" can 
work to undermine the official or high culture of any society. 
K. CLARK & M. HOLQUIST, supra note 37, at 276-77. 
Serio-comic genres that were a first step in the development of the novel destroyed distance 
through laughter thereby demolishing 
fear and piety before an object, before a world, making of it an object of familiar contact and 
thus clearing the ground for an absolutely free investigation of it. ... Familiarization of the 
world through laughter and popular speech is an extremely important and indispensable 
step in making possible free, scientifically knowable and artisticaJly realistic creativity in 
European civilization. 
M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 37, at 23. 
45. Booth, supra note 37, at xxii. 
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B. The Polyphony of the American Constitutional System and the 
Story of Origins 
Aspirations for the American republic and its technical legal re-
sources46 were early framed in terms that may be understood as those 
of polyphony (or terms for which polyphony might serve as an alter-
native). One example is James Madison's great desideratum of a gov-
ernment preserving both minority rights and the spirit of popularity.47 
He imagined that such a government would be achieved through a 
"judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle"48 genera-
tive of a "multiplicity of interests"49 attached to one another by "that 
chain of connection, that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in 
one indissoluble bond of unity and amity."50 
Another example of what might be taken as political polyphony is 
John Adams' republican notion of the passion for distinction, which 
he took to be a fundamental, powerful human disposition. 51 This pas-
sion was to be directed away from accumulation of wealth toward "ac-
tivity for the good of others" where the reward would be esteem and. 
admiration rather than money. 52 (Such a regime would help to allevi-
ate the particular indignity visited upon the poor person, who "is not 
disapproved, censured, or reproached; he is only not seen. ")53 Adams 
concluded that "[i]t is a principal end of government to regulate this 
passion, which in tum becomes a principal means of govemment."54 
The American polity would depend upon and stage the passion for 
distinction, the drive of many, diverse citizens to be at the same time 
autonomous and engaged with others in public virtue. 
A third example of (arguable) polyphony is Thomas Jefferson's 
late, repeated urging to divide counties into wards. He had in mind a 
structure composed of elementary republics that would protect both 
the autonomy of citizens and their participation in "the government of 
affairs."55 Wards would fulfill the division of the republic "from the 
46. On the possibility of court as a theater in which personae juris allow the voices of citizens 
to be heard, see M. BALL, supra note l, at 40-94. 
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 353 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted). 
49. Id. at 352. 
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 327 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting the New Hampshire Constitution). 
51. See J. ADAMS, Discourses on Davila, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 221, 232 passim 
(C.F. Adams ed. 1851). 
52. Id. at 234, 238-39, 246, 271, 397-98. 
53. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original). 
54. Id. at 234. 
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), reprinted in THE LIFE 
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great national one down through all its subordinations, until it ends in 
the administration of every man's farm by himself. 56 The result would 
be a "gradation of authorities, standing each on the basis of law, hold-
ing every one its delegated share of powers, and constituting truly a 
system of fundamental balances and checks for the government"57 -
a divided, representative, and therefore polyphonic rather than mono-
phonic whole. 
The American legal order, imaged as an inclusive federal republic, 
fitly subsists in narrative, which can realize polyphony "formed by the 
interaction of several consciousnesses, none of which entirely becomes 
an object for the other."58 
For this reason it is appropriate that the Declaration of Indepen-
dence should be accepted as the originating written source of the story, 
for the rhetoric of that document59 exhibits thoroughly polyphonic 
qualities. They are evident, for example, in the first sentence's "decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind," and, more pointedly, in the voice 
and stance illustrated by the second sentence, which has come to have 
such central importance. 6o 
By its nature, polyphony prohibits one voice or consciousness, in-
cluding that of the author, from imposing its unobstructed intention 
upon another. Intention can only be mediated "through the intentions 
of others, beginning with the otherness of the language itself."61 Dia-
logue is an essential. "This does not mean that I cannot make my own 
point of view understood; it simply implies that my point of view will 
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 660 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944); see 
also H. ARENDT, supra note 6, at 252 passim. 
56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, supra note 55, at 660. Distinguish the 
related notion of John Rawls: "Taking part in political life does not make the individual master 
of himself, but rather gives him an equal voice along with others in settling how basic social 
conditions are to be arranged." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 233 (1971). 
57. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, supra note 55, at 661. The role of states 
as voices in federalism and article V's provision for amending the Constitution may also be iden-
tified as polyphonic. 
58. M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS, supra note 37, at 18. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., made an appeal to political polyphony: "Too long has our beloved 
Southland been bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than dialogue." M.L. 
KING, Letter from {the} Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 77, 82 (1964). 
59. The Declaration is not itself a story but does employ narrative to describe the grievances 
held against the King. 
60. When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the 
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of 
Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
Jefferson, The Declaration oflndependence, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER, supra note 25, at 83, 86. 
61. K. CLARK & M. HOLQUIST, supra note 37, at 245. 
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only emerge through the interaction of my own and another's words 
as they contend with each other in particular situations."62 
The Declaration's second sentence tacitly recognizes that, in a 
democratic society, even self-evident truth requires mediation, dia-
logue, consent. Had the truths recited by Jefferson been self-evident in 
the sense that they were politically monologic, i.e., irresistibly compel-
ling, he would simply have announced them rather than prefacing 
them with the formula "We hold." This introduction is a grammatical 
acknowledgement that truth, equality, and rights require agreement in 
the republic. They are matters of opinion exchanged and held. "We 
hold this opinion because freedom is possible only among equals, and 
we believe that the joys and gratifications of free company are to be 
preferred to the doubtful pleasures of holding dominion. Such prefer-
ences are politically of the greatest importance . . . . Their validity 
depends upon free agreement and consent."63 The polyphonic form 
and content of the Declaration - like the story that follows from it -
is consistent with the images, structure, and aspirations for the consti-
tutional system. 
In Taney's hands the Declaration was a monologic or apophantic 
announcement, not a dialogic holding. He saw no discrepancy be-
tween the practices of the Framers and the words of the Declaration. 
Nor would he allow any discrepancy between the words so determined 
and the realities of the present. There was only one voice and no ten-
sion. By the Taney approach, neither the founders nor the foundation 
would be improved. 
Taney had sought monologue, had sought to eliminate the tension 
of dialogue by allowing the practices of the Framers to determine both 
their rhetoric and the nation's present. Douglass read the Declaration 
polyphonically; he recognized the tensions between rhetoric and prac-
tice and between past and present. He played upon it in order to 
render the American story polyphonic and thereby engage the story to 
draw both past and present toward a better, more expansive future. 
So did Lincoln. In the Gettysburg Address, he distinguished the 
nation begun in the Declaration and dedicated to equality ("that na-
tion") from the presently existing one ("this nation"). There was a 
gap - a dialogic space - between them, realized in the field at Get-
tysburg, where the struggle for their meaning took place. To sustain 
both realities and maintain the tension between them required, in a 
62. Id. 
63. Arendt, Reflections: Truth and Politics, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1967, at 49, 62; see 
also G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978). I am especially indebted to Arendt's instructive 
reading of Lincoln. 
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word Lincoln used five times, dedication. The nation was "dedicated" 
to equality; he had come to "dedicate" the cemetery; the living are to 
be "dedicated" to the great task remaining. Dedication is the singular 
action of polyphony and dialogue: at the same time setting apart and 
committing oneself to, giving up and binding. 
Legal texts and institutions take on radically different meanings 
with different consequences depending upon their narrative context. 
The American story of origins is told as though the republic originated 
in the Declaration of Independence and is dedicated to equality. Told 
in this way, it provides authority to the legal order but may also trans-
form it and in the process undergo transformation itself. This trans-
forming, dialogic capacity continues to be confirmed by the telling of 
the story beginning in an original promise of equality that requires 
present fulfillment. 
C. Polyphony, Conservation, and Transformation 
Cotton Mather hoped to conserve the cherished ways of his gener-
ation by preserving their story: 
I shall count my country lost in the loss of the Primitive Principles, and 
the Primitive Practices, upon which it was first Established: But cer-
tainly one good way to save that Loss would be to do something ... that 
the Story of the Circumstances attending the Foundation and Formation 
of this Country, and of its Preservation hitherto, may be impartially 
handed unto Posterity. 64 
In fact, the story of origins is conservative. It exerts the gravita-
tional pull of past generations upon those of the present. 65 When they 
are drawn into the story, contemporary Americans are brought under 
the authority of the founding fathers. 
The story of origins, however, like a work of art, is never finished 
and is therefore empowering and transforming as well as conserving. 
Its content is not static, and its telling is not fixed. The story is unfin-
ished in the sense that it is still being told; the United States and the 
Constitution still exist. But the story is unfinished also in the sense 
that it is still being written, is still open to alteration and amendment, 
is still subject to what present generations will make of it. 
If narrative is polyphonic, then it is unprivileged. It is open to 
dialogue with successions of readers, and through the dialogue may be 
influenced by them. 66 This plasticity figures in transformation. The 
story includes - or is made to include - us. But when we participate 
64. H. ARENDT, supra note 6, at 318 (citing Magnolia, Book II). 
65. On the unifying, centripetal forces, see infra note 140. 
66. About John F. Kennedy's death, Auden wrote: 
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we engage in dialogue. We become those the story would have us be, 
and the story becomes what we would have it be. Story and audience 
are mutually subject to betterment. 67 
There is "a kind of necessary 'augmentation' by virtue of which all 
innovations and changes remain tied back to the foundation which, at 
the same time, they augment and increase. " 68 For this reason, the 
American story of origins is improved as it improves the legal order. 69 
That the American story of origins is still being written is one of the 
reasons that its effects, content, and telling are not finally settled. Its 
substance and meaning are still contested. The story of the circum-
stances attending the foundation conserves but also transforms and is 
transformed, as polyphonic narrative should in a democratic society. 70 
What he was, he was: 
What he is fated to become 
Depends on us. 
Remembering his death, 
How we choose to live 
Will decide its meaning. 
W.H. AUDEN, Elegy for J.F.K., in ABOUT THE HOUSE 57-58 (1965). 
67. Madison hoped that future generations would "improve and perpetuate" the Constitu-
tion. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 89 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
68. H. ARENDT, supra note 6, at 203. 
69. The corrupting of the story is taken up infra. 
70. I do not know whether the American story of origins will be found accessible or not to 
the cause of women. In the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln referred to the new nation as one 
"brought forth" by "our fathers." Like Athena's birth, it was monogenetic; no mother played a 
role. The 1848 assembly at Seneca Falls - the beginning of the organized movement for wo-
men's rights - was clearly aimed at causing the American story of origins to be enlarged and 
read as one embracing women. Its "Declaration of Sentiments" opened: 
When, in the course of human events, it becomel! necessary for one portion of the family 
of man to assume among the people of the earth a position different from that which they 
have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle 
them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the 
causes that impel them to such a course. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal .... 
The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER, supra 
note 25, at 376, 378-79. My uncertainty arises from questions both about the plasticity of the 
American story and legal order and about whether women will prefer to bring a different reality 
to bear. On the latter issue, specifically discussed in the light of the Seneca Falls Declaration, see 
c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 128-50 (1982). It may be that women will teach men that 
there are other stories of origin than the one dominated by white males under western European 
influence. For an approach different from that of Gilligan, see C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED (1987). On difference and the difference it makes, see Minow, The Supreme Court, 
1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
Frederick Douglass was a longtime comrade-in-arms of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and 
Douglass was on hand at Seneca Falls. As a matter of pure conjecture, I have wondered whether 
Douglass got the idea for the constitutive rhetorical importance of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence from the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, and whether Lincoln subsequently got it 
from Douglass. 
My point is that women may now either cause a version of the story to include them fully and 
authentically or inspire the telling of an alternate American story of origins. 
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III. THE AMERICAN STORY AND NATIVE AMERICANS 
A. Tales About Indians 
The notion of polyphony provides a way to talk about narrative 
that helps to describe the strength, goodness, adaptability, and useful-
ness of the American story of origins; it also helps identify the story's 
limits and harmfulness. 
No version of the American story gives full voice to Native Ameri-
cans. 71 The American legal order debars the autonomy of tribes and 
the possibility of dialogue with them as independent centers of sover-
eignty. This exclusion cannot be overcome in the received rhetorical 
manner by telling the story of American origins because that story 
simply entrenches the exclusion. In this regard, the story is internally 
polyphonic but externally monophonic. 
The story can be told - and often is - as one in which the tribes 
are destroyed. The new nation was brought forth on this continent by 
conquering the "wilderness" and its "savages."72 There is in this story 
no tribal voice and no polyphony. 
Told in another fashion, the story may seem to include Indian 
voices but is no less insidiously monophonic, for the Indians are given 
voice only as they are assimilated or made over into acceptable carica-
tures - e.g., Tonto and the Lone Ranger. 
Or the Thanksgiving story. After they arrived, the Mayflower Pil-
grims "[w]ith the help of a friendly Indian ... learned how to plant 
and cultivate corn; Miles Standish taught them how to shoot game; 
fish, clams, and lobsters were plentiful. In October [of 1621] they in-
vited friendly Wampanoag Indians to share their first Thanksgiving 
feast, and concluded a treaty with the sachem Massasoit."73 Happy 
Pilgrims. Happy Indians. We were all taught the story early. And we 
eat lots of turkey as a way of reenacting it every year. 
Most of the Native Americans I know observe Thanksgiving as a 
day of fasting. What cannot be divined from the idyll is why they do 
so, or why the Pilgrims would soon build a fort at Plymouth out of 
fear for Indians. Only recently, and without popular notice, has atten-
tion been paid to such details as that game hunting was not the only 
subject Miles Standish taught. "Pretending to the Indians that he had 
71. My conclusion is based upon the legal material reviewed in Ball, Constitution, Court, 
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. I. Some of the subjects addressed in the following 
pages are more fully discussed in that essay. 
72. "Wilderness" and "savages" are ideological descriptions of the North American conti· 
nent and the people whose home it was. 
73. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 56 (1965). 
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come to . . . trade, he enticed a few of them into his hands and then 
massacred them without warning."74 Shortly thereafter, massacre 
would become the policy put into effect against the Pequot. 75 
Or, in the Tonto and Thanksgiving style, there is the example of 
my native state, Georgia, which drove out the last of the tribes along 
the Trail of Tears in the 1830s only to bring back in my lifetime the 
Atlanta Braves, with their Chief Nok-a-homa who would emerge from 
his tepee to do a little "Indian" dance for every Braves home run. 
When Indians are made out as savages of the past whose aggressive 
want of civilization warrants their destruction; they are certainly al-
lowed no voice. When they are depicted as simple, servile caricatures 
- as in the Tonto, Thanksgiving, and Braves genres - their only 
voice in the American story is that of assimilated or Disneyfied but not 
that of the tribal Indians. 
B. Law Tales About Indians 
Until recently, the legal academy has been largely silent about the 
relationships between the Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the 
tribes, and has left what is called "federal Indian law" to a handful of 
specialists. Indian cases have been among the most frequently decided 
by the Court for the last several years and are among the most jµris-
prudentially illuminating. However, although constitutional law 
casebooks include many materials on the struggles of racial and other 
minorities for rights, they almost never include cases about Indian 
tribes. Many do not employ the words Indian, Native American, or 
tribe at all. 
The relation between American law and Native Americans has a 
complex past and present that may be summarized as follows (with the 
imprecisions customary of any gross simplification): Congress has 
worked its will upon the tribes in whatever way it has wished, even 
when its actions have wholly lacked a constitutional basis or have ob-
viously violated treaties (treaties which were honored and fully per-
formed by the tribes). The Supreme Court has never held an act of 
Congress against the tribes to be unconstitutional. Instead it has 
either decided that treatment of tribes is a nonjusticiable political 
question or invented grounds for upholding Congressional acts 
notwithstanding their transparent lack of constitutionality. 
Indians have developed their lobbying skills, and not since 1968 
has Congress enacted legislation over tribal opposition. However, now 
74. F. JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA 186 (1975); see also id. at 187. 
75. Id. at 202-27. 
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that Congress has, at least temporarily, laid down the role of aggressor 
against the tribes, the Supreme Court has taken it up. 
This was not the role initially performed by the Court under John 
Marshall. At the beginning, Marshall had the opportunity to speak 
several times about Indians, and what he said cannot always be recon-
ciled. Worcester v. Georgia 76 was the occasion for his most complete 
statement on the subject and also his last. Samuel Worcester, a mis-
sionary and American citizen, was imprisoned by Georgia for entering 
Cherokee territory without the state's permission. The Court held 
Georgia's action to be extraterritorial and illegal. There had been no 
conquest of the natives; their rights had not been extinguished by war. 
"The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its 
own territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force."77 
Indian nations were to be accorded the protection of allies. 78 
Earlier, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 a case involving a dispute be-
tween non-Indians about ownership of land that had belonged to Indi-
ans, Marshall found that the plaintiffs' claim was defeated principally 
because the Indians had extinguished their title. 80 In the course of his 
opinion, he noted that non-Indians might be incorporated into tribes.81 
The reverse, i.e., Indian incorporation into non-Indian society, he 
found to be impossible. 82 
At the end of John Marshall's tenure, so much was clear: the 
tribes had not been conquered and could not be incorporated. More 
than that was unclear. Whether they were to exist within or alongside 
the constitutional reality was not decided. Recently, however, and by 
its own hand, the Supreme Court has both conquered the tribes and 
incorporated them. 
A year after Brown v. Board of Education, 83 in Tee-Hit-Ton Indi-
ans v. United States, 84 the Court held that aboriginal lands of the 
Tlinget in Alaska could be seized by the United States without pay-
ment of just compensation. To justify the rule, applicable to the prop-
erty of Native Americans but not to that of Americans, the Court said: 
"Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this conti-
76. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
77. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561; see also Ball, supra note 71, at 31-33. 
78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-62. 
79. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
80. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593-97; see also Ball, supra note 71, at 23-29. 
81. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593. 
82. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590. 
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
84. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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nent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even 
when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blan-
kets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that 
deprived them of their land."85 Somehow, "after conquest"86 property 
of the Tlingit was not property protected by the fifth amendment. 
Why ancient conquest would justify contemporary seizures of 
property is unexplained. Also unexplained is when and how the Tlin-
git were taken by force. As one American schoolwoman knows: "The 
only sovereign act that can be said to have conquered the Alaska na-
tives was the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion itself."87 The conquest is a recent, 
legal-historical fiction, but a fiction with painful bite for Indian tribes. 
Having conquered the Tlingit in Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court then in-
corporated tribes into the United States in Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe. 88 Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist stated 
the motif: "Indian reservations are 'a part of the territory of the 
United States.' ... Indian tribes 'hold and occupy [the reservations] 
with the assent of the United States, and under their authority.' " 89 
He added: "Upon incorporation into the territory of the United 
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty 
of the United States."90 Because the tribes had been "incorporated," 
their power could be diminished as Court interpretations might 
determine. 
The phrase "upon incorporation" is a performative utterance. 
Like the conquest of tribes in the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion, the incorpora-
85. 348 U.S. at 289-90 (emphasis added). 
86. 348 U.S. at 279. 
87. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
1215, 1244 (1980). 
88. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
89. 435 U.S. at 208-09 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 
567, 571-72 (1846) Taney, C.J.). Departures in Supreme Court law from the Marshall views of 
Worcester began with Rogers. But Taney did not go so far as Rehnquist. At least Taney did not 
incorporate the tribes. In Rogers, Taney wrote that tribes had "never been acknowledged or 
treated as independent nations by the European governments." 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. The 
tribes were "continually held to be, and treated as, subject to their dominion and control." 45 
U.S. (4 How.) at 572. 
Later, Taney would speak very differently of the tribes. In the course of his Dred Scott opin-
ion, he described Indians as a "free and independent people ... governed by their own laws." 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857). He went on to explain that "neither 
the English nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised any dominion over the tribe or na-
tion,'' which he described as "Indian Governments" whose "freedom has constantly been ac-
knowledged, from the time of the first emigration ... to the present day." 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 
404. 
These two accounts by the same Chief Justice are in direct conflict. Justice Rehnquist chose 
the former rather than the latter. Perhaps the endorsement of Indian autonomy in Dred Scott 
had the sole purpose of comparing Indians with black people to the detriment of the latter. 
90. 435 U.S. at 208. 
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tion of tribes in Oliphant happened in and with - only in and with -
the Court's announcement of it. The conquest and incorporation of 
Indians was done by sleight of hand rather than force of arms, by the 
present Supreme Court rather than armies of the past. 
C. Salvaging the Story of Origins 
Tonto, Thanksgiving, and the Atlanta Braves (tales about happy 
Indians) and their recent Supreme Court analogue (tales about con-
quered and incorporated Indians) do not necessarily mean that the 
American story of origins cannot be cured, cannot be made to include 
tribes as independent voices and so be employed to expand the consti-
tutional order to embrace them as authentic realities. The Court's 
tales mask its contemporary jurispathic91 acts by presenting them as 
though they belong to the past and to necessity. But then the fault 
may be said to lie not in the story but in the storytellers, whose ver-
sions could be countered and corrected. 
When narrative is genuinely polyphonic, it remains subject to the 
meaning and consequence given by included present and future audi-
ences. Douglass eventually prevailed over Taney. There is no guaran-
tee that such dialogue will result in improvement and enlargement. 
The story of origins is as vulnerable to propagandistic revision as it is 
open to improvement. But where propaganda has taken over, it can be 
cured. 
The monophony of the story in the instance of Indian tribes might 
be an example of constriction - remediable constriction - of the 
story by the storytellers. If so, the plasticity and goodness of the story 
and the regenerative power of its telling might be restored by launder-
ing the corruptions out, renewing its inherent integrity and viability. 
However, although there are instances where the story could be 
worked at least partially clean and so be made to include a more genu-
ine tribal voice, they are peripheral. The American story of origins 
fundamentally excludes tribes and denies them voice. 
I shall offer a few examples of the possibility of remediation and 
then a few examples of its impossibility. I want to credit the American 
story of origins and its polyphonic potential for the tribal voice. How-
ever, I believe that it cannot be told in such a way that the tribes speak 
and are heard. Even the goodness of the story - especially the good-
ness - is bad for Indians. I hope I am wrong. 
91. The jurispathic nature of courts is discussed in Cover, supra note 1. 
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1. The Black Hills 
The Black Hills afford an example of curable wrong. In the 1980 
case of United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 92 the Supreme Court 
upheld a judgment awarding compensation to the Sioux for the taking 
of the Black Hills. In contrast to the tales of conquest it has spun on 
other occasions, the Court here recognized that the 1868 Fort Laramie 
Treaty was "a complete victory for Red Cloud and the Sioux," the 
only time the United States has "gone to war and afterwards negoti-
ated a peace conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exact-
ing nothing in retum."93 The Black Hills were acknowledged to be 
Indian country.94 
The Court went on to note that prospectors had been summoned 
to the Black Hills by George Custer's "florid descriptions" of the 
area's gold and silver resources.95 The Army, originally sent to fore-
stall intrusion by the prospectors, soon supported their cause. In the 
following campaign, Sitting Bull destroyed Custer· and his troops at 
the Little Big Hom. The Sioux would lose by other means. 
The Fort Laramie Treaty had specified that cessions of land to the 
United States would require the consent of three fourths of the adult 
males of the tribe. A subsequent treaty did purport to convey the 
Black Hills to the United States, but it showed the consent of only ten 
percent, not the clearly required seventy-five percent, of the nation's 
males. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the consent of 
those few. 
The Sioux have never surrendered their treaty-guaranteed right to 
the Black Hills. There was no legal forum in which they could seek 
vindication of their right until Congress passed a special jurisdictional 
act in 1920. A claim for the Sioux was filed and eventually dismissed 
in 1942. Subsequently the Indian Claims Commission was created, 
and the Sioux claim was submitted to that body in 1950. In 1974, the 
Commission found that the United States had violated the fifth 
amendment, and set compensation for the Black Hills at $17 .5 million 
(plus five percent interest), the value of the 7.3 million acres in 1877. 
It was this judgment that the Supreme Co~rt upheld. 96 
Most of the Sioux have refused to accept the money. To them 
92. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
93. 448 U.S. at 376 n.4. 
94. See generally P. MATIHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 201-20 (1984); 1 & 2 F. PRUCHA, 
THE GREAT FATHER 540, 631-40 (1984); R. SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT 325-476 
(1985). 
95. 448 U.S. at 377. 
96. 448 U.S. at 371-72. 
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money is no substitute for return of the land. The Sioux were subject 
to such legal representation as they could obtain. Their counsel, inex-
plicably, acceded to the proposition that the United States could le-
gally abrogate the Fort Laramie Treaty and that the United States 
held title to Sioux and all Indian land. Counsel focused on money 
damages. Although the Sioux have refused the money, their lawyers 
have taken their allotted ten percent of the amount.97 
The case does encourage hope because the Supreme Court did 
demonstrate that it has access to stories other than those of schoolchil-
dren. Displacement of the myths of conquest and incorporation is 
possible. Moreover, the constriction of the law imposed by the remedy 
in United States v. Sioux Nation can be removed. The formula for 
valuation may have so underpriced the land as itself to constitute a 
litigable violation of the fifth amendment. A more adequate formula 
could be introduced. Also, the courts are not confined to money dam-
ages. They and the Congress could respond with flexibility. They 
could return the land, certainly at least those considerable portions of 
it that are public and are held by the federal government.98 Moreover 
the voice of the Sioux can certainly be better heard in the judicial pro-
cess through a different quality of legal representation. 
Of course, the Court can always revert at will to might-makes-
right confections of conquest and incorporation with baneful conse-
quences for the tribes, as it demonstrated two years later in a different 
case when Justice Thurgood Marshall maintained that Congress' "su-
perior position over the tribes" allowed it to have its way with them.99 
This is nothing new and is no reason to forfeit sanguinity. If the vul-
nerable story of origins has been corrupted by its official tellers, then 
United States v. Sioux Nation lends credence to the possibility that 
soundness can be restored. The polyphony of the story - its integrity 
and its potential for enlarging and improving the legal order, in this 
case its potential for including the tribal voices - might yet be pre-
served and extended. Sioux Nation, in any event, does not foreclose 
the possibility that the story might prove amenable to the tribes. 
97. See 448 U.S. at 411 n.27, 413 n.28; Tullberg & Coulter, The Failure of Indian Rights 
Advocacy, in NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 51, 53 (1982). 
98. There are 1.3 million acres of federal lands in the subject area of South Dakota in the 
Custer National Forest, the Black Hills National Forest, and Buffalo Gap National Grassland. 
For a map and description, see Harlan, Wording of Bradley Bill a Key in Hills Debate, The Rapid 
City Journal, Nov. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1. Senator William Bradley introduced legislation that 
would have effected a return of these lands to the Sioux. S. 705, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 133 
CONG. REC. S2921 {daily ed. Mar. 10, 1987). 
99. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 155 n.21 (1982). 
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2. Lone Wolf 
Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock 100 was a 1903 case that also concerned a 
treaty, the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge, which, like the Treaty of 
Fort Laramie, provided that cessions of reservation land would be 
valid only if they bore the signatures of three-fourths of the tribe's 
male members. Again the United States maneuvered a surrender of 
reservation lands and this time made unilateral changes in it before 
congressional ratification. 101 When the tribes sought judicial relief 
they pointed to the numerous defects: unilateral changes, payment of 
a fraction of the land's worth, consignment of the Indians to remain-
ing portions of the reservation that could not be made to support 
them, procurement of signatures through fraud, and the absence of the 
necessary number of signatures. 
This time the Court held that it could not "materially limit and 
qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and 
protection of the Indians." 102 Such "authority might be implied, even 
though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the lndians." 103 
Congress can violate Indian treaties at will. 
Lone Wolf is still law, and, in the Sioux Nation case, the Court 
asserted its continuing validity. 104 Even so, a cure for Lone Wolf is not 
terribly difficult to devise. The Amerjcan story can easily be made to 
embrace the obligation of the nation to keep its word promised in a 
treaty, and central to the Declaration of Independence and its after-
math is a commitment to "just power" derived from "the consent of 
the governed." In this instance, the problem does not lie in the story 
but in bringing the legal order into conformity with it. That would not 
be quick or simple, but nothing narratively, doctrinally, or theoreti-
cally exceptional is necessary. 
The immediate default at issue in both Sioux Nation and Lone 
Wolf was a treaty violation. The United States broke the law. The 
practice is at fault. The United States did not - but can and should 
- fulfill its treaty obligations. Pacta sunt servanda. This outcome, 
though beset with difficulty, remains within the realm of the legally, 
politically, and presently possible. The United States need only be 
convinced to abide by its own law in conformity to its own story of 
100. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
101. See 187 U.S. at 554-60. 
102. 187 U.S. at 564. 
103. 187 U.S. at 565. 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 411 n.27 (1980). 
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origins whose integrity, potential, and plasticity remain intact and 
available to the tribes. 
B. The Irremediable 
There is a further, complex problem inherent in Sioux Nation and 
Lone Wolf and the cases and law they represent. If full compensation 
were to be paid to the tribes or their land returned to them, past ac-
counts might then be settled, as they should be, and a start made to-
ward a just relationship between the United States and the tribes. But 
what shape would that relationship take? What would recompense for 
past wrongs do to advance or give content to a United States-Indian 
tribe future? If the United States obeys its law, what result? With 
what story do we constitute a renewed relationship between the 
United States and the tribes? Eliminate the happy tales and the tales 
of conquest and incorporation, and what story remains? We say that 
our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation dedicated to 
equality. What do the tribal voices say? Treatymaking with the tribes 
came to an end in 1871. Treaties were the prerogative of the Senate 
and President, and the House of Representatives tired of its reflexive 
role in appropriating funds for the implementation of treaties framed 
by others. One sentence, tacked onto an appropriations bill, discontin-
ued recognition of tribes as treatymaking sovereigns but did reaffirm 
the validity of treaties already entered. 105 
The year before this action was taken, the Supreme Court had held 
that subsequent legislation was controlling of earlier Indian treaties. 106 
In domestic law, the "last expression of the sovereign will must con-
trol." 107 In relationships with other nations, however, absent the con-
sent of the treaty partner, Congress cannot by legislation revoke a 
treaty and thereafter govern the former treaty partner by statute. On 
this matter, the legality of the 1871 measure has never been tested or 
clarified. 
In any event, after that year there would be no new treaties. In 
1903 Lone Wolf held that Congress can default on existing treaties 
with the tribes. Treaty relations with tribes are not necessarily a dead 
letter, however. 
The constitutional future for the relationship between the United 
States and Indian nations could be found in a reintroduction of 
treatymaking or in the use of executive agreements (coupled with spe-
105. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566. 
106. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 {1870). 
107. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). 
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cial legislation sought by the tribes). Taking responsibility for rela-
tions with the tribes out of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and placing it in the State Department (or back in the 
Department of Defense where it began) is imaginable as is an adapta-
tion of federalism (treaty federalism, e.g., or some form of alliance of 
tribes with the federal and state government). 
To this extent, the problem is one of will rather than legal form. 
The United States would be required only to acknowledge the validity 
of the tribal way. It is, after all, the oldest continuous form of politics 
practiced on this. continent and is at least as permanent as the republic. 
But that is what the United States is unable to do, and the story of 
origins does not transform this failure of will. Treaty federalism is a 
possibility, but would it not provide place for them in our system 
rather than constitute the coexistence of sovereign peoples? The limi-
tation lies in the story and not in the storyteller. There is no perform-
ance of the story that embraces tribes as tribes. Eliminating talk about 
the conquest and incorporation of Indian nations would not engender 
acceptance of them as independent centers of sovereignty, would not 
constitute polyphony. 
The Declaration oflndependence began by announcing the Ameri-
can people's assumption of their separate and equal station among the 
powers of the earth. The Gettysburg Address drew affective power 
from the story of a new nation brought forth on this continent. The 
founders believed themselves to have undertaken ·a novus ordo 
saeclorum. The story is one of a nation with a monogenetic birth. It is 
portrayed as exclusive, as though it had not been conceived in the 
midst of other resident, equally unique nations - in part over against 
them, in part with their aid and following their example. 
The supremacy clause is the constitutional reflection of the story's 
critical - apparently inescapable - claim to singularity. Toward the 
end of the constitutional assembly, the supremacy clause was submit-
ted to the Committee on Style. The draft clause read: "This Constitu-
tion- ... shall be the supreme law of the several States."108 What 
emerged from the Committee, without explanation, was: "This 
[C]onstitution ... shall be the supreme law of the land." 109 (Presuma-
bly "law of the land" was taken from the Magna Carta.) As originally 
drafted, the supremacy of the Constitution was confined to consenting 
sovereigns. It was juridically and geographically limited. In the re-
vised, final version - although its Framers may have discerned no 
108. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 572 (M. Farrand ed. 
1966). 
109. Id. at 603. 
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substantive difference - the supremacy of the Constitution had the 
capacity of an expansionist ideology. Given a sea-to-sea definition of 
"land," the clause could be made into a claim to a continental monop-
oly of jurisdiction unwarranted by the contemporary political and ter-
ritorial facts. 
The Constitution's supremacy over the states has had a generally 
beneficial effect on the nation's life, enlarging its commitment to civil 
rights. But the United States' claim to increasing jurisdictional 
supremacy over nonconsenting tribes is harmful to them and has no 
legitimate basis. In a federalism that made room for tribes, the Consti-
tution would still, presumably, be supreme. 
Constitutional supremacy is a great achievement of Americans but 
a threat to Native American tribes. This dilemma is carried over into 
the animating commitment to equality. Equal protection jurispru-
dence provides for equality of assimilation into the constitutional real-
ity. As it has done so it has worked to the advantage of some, like 
those blacks whose appeal to justice has been an appeal to equality. 
To the extent that individual Indians, as American citizens, seek to be 
treated as citizens of the United States, they, too, are beneficiaries of 
equal protection. However, assimilation into the jurisdictional mo-
nopoly destroys rather than benefits tribes. The great achievement 
and noble aspiration of equality is, at the same time and without aban-
doning its goodness and nobility, destructive of tribes. 
In a typically liberal-hearted gesture, Thomas Jefferson enjoined 
Indians to enclose lands and take up farming. Once their land became 
property, he added, they would then want laws for its protection. Jef-
ferson concluded: "You will find that our laws are good for this pur-
pose; you will wish to live under them, you will unite yourselves with 
us, join in our great councils and form one people with us, and we 
shall all be Americans; you will mix with us by marriage, your blood 
will run in our veins, and will spread with us over this great island." 110 
If to be an Indian means to be a participant in a tribe, then Jefferson's 
inspired admonition is unpromising. 
The American story, the singular constitutional republic, and the 
dedication to equality that have been so notable and so good for so 
many, have not been so for tribes. Two examples will illustrate. One 
comes from the past, the other from the present. 
110. s. PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 106-07 (1939). William Mc-
Laughlin several times employs the Jefferson statement in CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE 
NEW REPUBLIC xv, 33, 37 (1986). I have relied upon McLoughlin's book in my account of the 
Cherokee Nation. 
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1. The Cherokee Nation 
By the early nineteenth century, the Cherokee had few remaining 
resources for effective resistance to the enveloping alien civilization. 
The best available means of survival was adoption of the ideology and 
lifestyle of the newcomers. The Cherokee overcame their reluctance 
and internal divisions and set about preserving what remained of their 
identity and land by remaking themselves in the image of the United 
States. They took up farming, spinning, and writing, along with west-
ern dress and religion. In authentication of their ability to absorb 
everything really American, they adopted a constitution and the en-
slavement of blacks. 
Congress passed the Removal Bill in 1830. The Cherokee had 
done all they could to realize Jefferson's promise that "we shall all be 
Americans" - with one exception: they sought to continue as the 
Cherokee Nation. They undertook to maintain tribal jurisdiction 
within a system that declared a jurisdictional monopoly. The republic 
left no room for tribes. The Cherokee could survive as a tribe only by 
becoming American; they could only become American by ceasing to 
be a tribe. 
As the Cherokee became American in every way save in the essen-
tial circumstance of remaining Cherokee, President John Adams ex-
pressed alarm: "[W]e have unexpectedly found them forming in the 
midst of ourselves, communities claiming to be independent of ours 
and rivals of sovereignty within the territories of our Union." 111 This 
success, imitating the new republic, proved intolerable to non-Indians. 
In 1828, Andrew Jackson was elected President, and the Georgia leg-
islature voted to extend its law over the Cherokee Nation, whose inde-
pendence had been guaranteed by treaty. 
The last act was played out before the Supreme Court in 1832. 
Worcester v. Georgia, 112 as I have noted, remains the clearest, strongest 
judicial statement of tribal sovereignty and independence. It led Indi-
ans to think they had won, non-Indians to think their law had proved 
just, and both to believe that the tribes as well as the Constitution had 
remained intact. Representatives of Christian missioners enlightened 
the Cherokee. 
If carried to enforcement, the Court's decision, so it was feared, 
would play into the hands of southern separationists. (There was talk 
of secession in South Carolina. It was speculated that, if Georgians 
were unduly aroused by impolitic federal moves, they might be driven 
111. W. McLoUGHLIN, supra note 110, at 423. 
112. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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to side with their neighbors and so threaten the Union.) The Chris-
tians elected to "sacrifice the Cherokees to save the Union."113 They 
advised the tribe to strike a bargain and go west. 114 The Trail of Tears 
followed. The Court's decision came to nothing. Its only real conse-
quence was enhancement of the Court's role and power.1 15 
Perhaps the fate of the Cherokee may be attributed to the racism 
or ethnocentrism or xenophobia or land hunger of European Ameri-
cans, i.e., attributed to the pathology of the American story and the 
American legal order. I think such attribution misses the complexity 
of the dilemma. What happened to the Cherokee is inseparable from 
devotion to the soundness and goodness of the story and the law. 
2. ICRA and Rights 
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968116 represents another form of 
commitment to the best the American tradition has to give. The Bill 
of Rights and fourteenth amendment have been held not to apply 
against tribal governments~ 117 The Indian Civil Rights Act arose from 
congressional desire to "protect individual Indians from arbitrary and 
unjust actions of tribal governments."118 It provided for the applica-
tion of a selection and modification of the Bill of Rights against tribal 
governments. The action was endorsed by the Supreme Court as a 
permissible exercise of congressional authority to "eliminate the pow-
ers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess." 119 
Besides diminishing the power of tribal government, the insertion 
of the Act into the reservations threatens to remake tribal courts in the 
image of the federal judiciary. Such an institution with its system of 
rules and procedures would dislodge the "informality of Indian life 
that had been the repository of cultural traditions and customs" and 
transpose tribal society's understanding of "itself as a complex of re-
sponsibilities and duties ... into a society based on rights against gov-
ernment [thereby eliminating] any sense of responsibility that the 
people might have felt for one another."120 
This deleterious imposition of selected rights and a formal institu-
113. w. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 110, at 446. 
114. Id. 
115. See Ball, supra note 71, at 58-59. 
116. Codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1982). 
117. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
118. S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., !st Sess. 6 (1967). 
119. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). 
120. v. DELORIA & c. LITLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN 213 (1984). For two accounts that 
take a different view of ICRA and disagree with my assessment, see Laurence, Learning to Live 
With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988), and 
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tion for litigating them was evidently an insufficient approximation of 
American rights practice, for the Supreme Court divested tribal courts 
of jurisdiction to try non-Indians for crimes committed on reserva-
tions. It did so in the name of rights in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe. 121 
The Court said that the Act had dissolved what it described as 
"many of the dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by 
tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few de-
cades ago."122 Too many of these "dangers" apparently remain. The 
idea that Native Americans cannot be allowed to try non-Native 
Americans "would have been obvious a century ago when most Indian 
tribes were characterized by a 'want of fixed laws [and] of competent 
tribunals of justice.' . . . It should be no less obvious today, even 
though present-day Indian tribal courts embody dramatic advances 
over their historical antecedents."123 
The Court noted that, "from the formation of the Union and the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested ... 
great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States from 
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."124 Protection of 
rights and liberty requires the Supreme Court to rescue today's Ameri-
cans just as the cavalry was supposed to rescue their frontier predeces-
sors when they fell into Native American hands. Devotion to the Bill 
of Rights does not require the Justices to mount their horses and 
charge off on swashbuckling, indiscriminate raids upon Indian vil-
lages, but, according to Oliphant, it does require the Court to restrict 
tribal sovereignty and diminish tribal dignity. . 
The achievement of Union under the Constitution that eventually 
ended the enslavement of blacks required the sacrifice of the tribes. In 
the instances of the Cherokee Nation, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the American legal order was 
obeyed, upheld, and extended, and the American story of origins was 
affirmed - to the detriment of tribes. 
IV. OTHER STORIES OF ORIGIN AND ALTERNATIVE 
LEGAL ORDERS 
Francis Jennings observes that the early statesmen of the United· 
Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, IO CAMPBELL L. REV. 411 (1988). 
121. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
122. 435 U.S. at 212. 
123. 435 U.S. at 210 (quoting an 1834 Congressional report). 
124. 435 U.S. at 210. 
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States had a better "sense of reality than most imperialists" because 
when they "saw Euramericans filling up their own new colonies, 
which they called 'territories' in distinction from their 'states' ... they 
realized that those westerners were as independent minded as them-
selves." 125 Accordingly, they provided for their colonies to enter the 
Union on a parity with the thirteen original states. "This was perhaps 
the greatest political invention of modern times, but the Indian tribes 
were left out of it."126 
The American story, beginning with the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, contains dialogue and respect for other voices. The legal order 
to which it gives authority is therefore subject to inclusive improve-
ment. But there is only one story and only one legal order. The story 
provides no legitimation for unilateral assertion of United States juris-
diction over tribes, yet neither does it provide for dialogue with auton-
omous tribes - with their stories of origin and their legal orders. 
Native American tribes are a striking exception to Robert Cover's be-
lief that "[a]ll Americans share a national text in the first or thirteenth 
or fourteenth amendment."127 
Giving the Supremacy Clause a territorial referent renders jurisdic-
tion exclusive. There is an incapacity for acknowledging the validity 
of Indian sovereigns. The limitation is not one of territory. Territori-
ality is a way of organizing and talking about power. The problem is 
one of power, not space. There is plenty of the latter. A solution 
would require that the United States discontinue expanding "in the 
name of liberty" its "empire over Indian territories and peoples."128 
The American story, however, does not empower the will to this 
end. The dialogue realized in the story and the legal order does not 
animate dialogue with excluded tribes. In this regard, telling the story 
cannot improve the story or the legal order. The internal polyphony is 
externally monophonic. The story is self-contained and, to this extent, 
self-contradictory. 
It may also be correspondingly self-destructive. John Beeson ap-
parently persuaded Lincoln that the Civil War was "an extension of 
the unneighborly, unChristian, and destructive practice which for gen-
125. F. JENNINGS, EMPIRE OF FORTUNE 479 (1988). 
126. Id. 
127. Cover, supra note 1, at 17. 
128. F. JENNINGS, supra note 125, at 457. The supremacy clause includes the supremacy of 
treaties. If the United States were to acknowledge the sovereignty of tribes and the validity of 
treaties with them, then the constitutional monopoly could give way. If the United States ac· 
knowledges the autonomy of foreign nations, and makes with them treaties that are the supreme 
law of the land, why not accord tribes the same treatment? What is the bar of territoriality? 
August 1989) Stories of Origin 2311 
erations had been operating against the Aborigines."129 Contempo-
rary commentators have advanced the theory that the Vietnam War 
was an unconscious replay of the murder of the Indians.130 And Barry 
Lopez points out how disastrous is the American narrative monopoly 
in the Arctic, where we "have no alternative, long-lived narrative to 
[that of the Eskimo], no story of human relationships with that land-
scape independent of Western science and any desire to control or pos-
sess. Our intimacy lacks historical depth, and is still largely innocent 
of what is obscure and subtle there." 131 The possible consequence is 
that "the modern industries - oil, gas, and mineral extraction -
might be embarked on a course as disastrously short-lived as was that 
of the whaling industry. And as naive - our natural histories of this 
region 150 years later are still cursory and unintegrated."132 
Self-determining Indian nations were the. politics of this continent 
until fairly recently. Their voices could figure in North American 
politics now and in future - to the essential benefit of the non-Indian 
majority. Such an eventuality requires more than one story of origins. 
A. Narrative Multiplicity 
Part Four of John Steinbeck's East of Eden opens with the belief 
that "there is one story in the world, and only one."133 A single 
American story inclusive of tribal voices might be achieved by taking a 
starting point earlier than the customary one(s). Douglass and Lin-
coln moved the beginning back from the Constitution to the Declara-
tion of Independence so that the story could be told as one of equality 
embracing blacks. 134 A longer step into the past to an earlier begin-
ning might produce an American story that comprehends the Native 
American voice. An opening could be drawn from Indian stories of 
origin, for example. Or the story could start with what is known 
about the coming of the first people so that human presence on the 
continent would compose a narrative about a continuing series of ar-
rivals, beginning with Indians and including Africans, Europeans, 
and, subsequently, others.135 
129. 1 F. PRUCHA, supra note 94, at 468. 
130. c. BLY, LETIERS FROM THE COUNTRY 9 (1981); see also R. SLOTKIN, supra note 94, at 
16-18. 
131. B. LoPEZ, ARCTIC DREAMS 11 (1987). 
132. Id. 
133. J. STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 413 (1952). 
134. Daniel Boorstin began his collection of American documents with the Mayflower Com-
pact. AN AMERICAN PRIMER, supra note 25, at 19. The arrival of Puritans and Pilgrims and 
The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut provide the starting point for others as well. 
135. There are subsidiary stories, and there have always been variations on the story of ori-
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Although the one-story option with a tribally inclusive beginning 
has its attractions, there are reasons for preferring multiple stories. 
One is that a single, grandly integrating story is unnecessary and mis-
leading. If reality and truth are multiple, 136 then an ur-story is un-
likely and will be inadequate to experience. Another reason for 
multiple stories is suspicion. If there is to be but one story,. there is 
question about what it shall be, what shall count as story, and who 
shall be the judge. If history is written by the victors, then a single 
story may strive to be comprehensive but will nevertheless be suspect 
as a composition of the currently dominant ideology. 137 
Nondominating groups have histories that run "on different tracks 
and with different timetables."138 We would "do better if we attempt 
to set the American Revolution within the larger and longer frame of 
reference of the history of Indians, blacks, and women, rather than 
force their history into the framework of American political history 
and its periodization."139 The politics of the continent as well as its 
historiography would do better if the story of American origins were 
told together with other stories of origin. The multiple voices realized 
in one story would then be matched by multiple stories. The contra-
diction of internal polyphony and external monophony would be 
eliminated. 140 
gins, the dominant version of which differs from one time to the next. We live in a complex of 
stories of origin, so that, for example, a calendar may be composed of various years with different 
beginnings: a religious year, a personal year (birthdays, anniversaries), a civic year, a fiscal year, 
or a seasonal year. Or time may run nonannually or noncyclicly, as in the instance of geologic 
time. 
136. In my theological tradition, for example, the fundamental reality - what is really real 
- is multiple: the Trinity, a society of Father, Son, and Spirit. And the biblical stories have it 
that humanity is a reflection of the godhead insofar as we are created male and female, i.e., the 
fundamentally human is multiple. Genesis 1:27 (Revised Standard Version). 
137. To argue for inclusion of tribes in a single story or for recognition of the validity of their 
stories is to argue for the sharing or decentralization of power. A transfiguration of power is 
necessary. Narrative as such is unlikely to effect transfiguration. See infra notes 149-SS and 
accompanying text. 
138. Young, Afterword to THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 449, 460 (A. Young ed. 1976). 
139. Id. at 461. 
140. Bakhtin noted that at the heart of human existence there is a centripetal force driving us 
toward unity and coherence and a centrifugal force driving us apart and toward many voices. M. 
BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION, supra note 37, at 269-75. The centralizing forces work 
toward a unitary, ideologically saturated language, one that insures "a maximum of mutual un-
derstanding in all spheres of ideological life." Id. at 271. But verbal and ideological unification 
operates in the midst of the centrifugal forces that work toward decentralization and heteroglos-
sia and so provide dynamic vitality and development. 
The tension between the centrifugal and the centripetal is present within the legal order and 
its authorizing story and has allowed the nurturing of different voices. But a territorial monop-
oly of jurisdiction has removed the tension from sovereignty. The sovereign is monophonic. The 
vital tension would be reintroduced by recognizing the autonomy of Indian nations and engaging 
in dialogue with them. 
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B. The Iroquois Example 
Imperialism is not solely a western phenomenon. Among the Iro-
quois, one people in one land was an early aspiration and theme. 141 
The Great Law of the League of the Five Nations, likely founded 
sometime between 1400 and 1600, asserts that when the League wishes 
to establish the Great Peace with another nation "and that nation re-
fuses to accept the Great Peace, then by such refusal they bring a dec-
laration of war upon themselves from the Five Nations."142 The 
Great Peace would be settled upon the recalcitrant through the great 
conquest. 
To this· hardly unusual or inspiring imperialist theme there was 
added another that became central to Iroquois public political dis-
course: the Covenant Chain. The Chain was a complex, shifting 
bicultural confederation between English colonies and Indian tribes, 
predominantly the League of Five Nations. A body of traditions, cus-
toms, practices, and trading relations, its identifying quality "was its 
combination of membership of both Indian and European polities." 143 
The Chain was represented in various wampum belts. Among 
northeastern tribes, wampum was a medium of diplomacy as well as of 
exchange and mystery. 144 It was composed of beads worked out of 
shell and strung on deerskin strips that could be laced into belts. 
When employed in diplomacy, wampum was presented in a council 
accompanied by the words of an elected speaker. The larger the belt, 
the more emphasis it gave the spoken words. Nonacceptance of the 
belt was refusal of the proffered arrangement. Acceptance and the re-
ciprocal giving of a belt constituted a sacred engagement. Unlike 
western treaties ("not worth the paper they are written on"), wampum 
belts were aesthetically controlled pieces, valuable in themselves. To 
give one was to make a significant gift. To accept one was to take up a 
thing of value and assume the obligations that go with any worthy gift. 
The exchange in this way enacted the proposed binding (more 
performatively so than does contractual "consideration"). 
The images on wampum belts, created by patterns of different-
colored grains, are spare. They are suggestive rather than comprehen-
141. F. JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE 93 (1984). 
142. Id. at 93, 162·63. 
143. Id. at 368. I rely upon Jennings' account of the Chain and conversations with Professor 
Robert Williams of the University of Arizona Law School. For specific discussion about and 
practice of the Chain, see Proceedings of the Colonial Congress held at Albany, 1754, Docu-
MENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL H1sroRY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 853 (O'Callaghan 
& Fernow eds. 1856-87). 
144. I rely, again, upon conversations with Professor Williams and upon W. JACOBS, DIPLO-
MACY AND INDIAN GIFTS 19-24 (1950). 
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sive, visual rather than literal. Their interpretation and implementa-
tion - the meaning and obligation of the depicted engagements, the 
fine points - fl.owed from the enacted relationship and from related or 
accompanying stories. , 
As is not true of other agreements between Euramericans and Na-
tive Americans, in the instance of the Covenant Chain both text and 
interpretation were Indian. 145 The diplomatic medium was wampum 
belts whose exchange with accompanying ceremonies provided occa-
sion to "solemnly renew[,] brighten[,] and strengthen the ancient cove-
nant Chain."146 
One of these belts was the Two Row Wampum, whose story, as I 
have heard it, runs: 
When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the European 
nations, treaties of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbol-
ized by the Gus-Wen-Tah, or Two Row Wampum. There is a bed of 
white wampum which symbolizes the purity of the agreement. There are 
two rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit of your ancestors 
and mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two rows 
and they symbolize peace, friendship and respect. 
These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling 
down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the 
Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The other, a 
ship, will be for the white people and their laws, their customs and their 
ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in our 
own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel. 147 
Like its form (a belt) and matrix (a Native American universe), the 
145. Reservation of interpretation to non-Indians is not limited to diplomacy. It has been 
observed that some ethnologists distinguish between doing stories and telling about stories in 
such a way that "the 'telling about' the story, including commentary and interpretation, [is left] 
entirely up to the ethnologist, while the proper business of the native is limited to the 'doing of' 
the story." Tedlock, The Spoken Word and the Work of Interpretation in American Indian Reli-
gion, in TRADITIONAL LITERATURES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 45, 48 (K. Kroeber ed. 1981). 
This approach is close to that "of the French structuralists, who limit the native to a narrative 
... function and concede the exclusive rights to the analytic ... function to themselves. In effect 
the coJlected texts are treated as if they were raw products, to which value is then added by the 
manufacture." Id. 
146. Proceedings of the Colonial Congress Held at Albany, 1754, supra note 143, at 862. 
147. This version of the story is quoted from Indian Self-Government in Canada: Report of 
the Special Committee, House of Commons, Canada, 32d Parliament, 1st Sess., back cover 
(1983), which is virtually the same as one given by the belt's sacred keeper to a gathering at 
which I was present. The text as quoted may also be found in Williams, The Algebra of Federal 
Indian Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 291. What constitutes a story may be culturally relative. 
The Two Row Wampum indicates that there are different ways to configure a narrative. Indian 
stories may be nonlinear. See, e.g., THE WISHING BONE CYCLE (H. Norman ed./trans. 1976) 
(note also the comments in the preface by Rothenberg at p. x). Translating nonlinear narrative 
into the acceptably linear story of law can pose insuperable difficulties as was indicated by the 
experience of the Mashpee when they were asked to demonstrate to a federal court their continu-
ous existence since the seventeenth century. See J. CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 
7-8, 277-346 (1988). 
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subject of the Two Row Wampum is not familiar to the American 
tradition of narratively and jurisdictionally monolithic nation-states. 
It speaks of multiple stories and polycentric jurisdiction.148 
C. Further Examples 
The Iroquois wampum contains multiple sovereigns. It does not 
describe how the coexistence is achieved. Nor has it of itself achieved 
coexistence. It has not generated the political truth of its rhetorical 
reality. An accepted wampum enacts or presupposes the requisite re-
lations but cannot cause itself to be accepted any more than self-evi-
dent truth unilaterally gains purchase in a democratic society. 
Wampum cannot transform the will; neither can the stories accompa-
nying it. There must be already willing listeners. 
The river could bear more traffic than the American monopoly 
currently licenses. Nevertheless we cannot talk or imagine ourselves 
into a politic of two boats side by side. A powerful establishment does 
not yield to romanticism or sentimentality, and storytelling -. 
whether of one story or several - does not transfigure the relation-
ships of power politics. For this reason, at least some of the accepted 
Native American and western transformative stories are themselves 
transparent; they direct us beyond themselves to other sources of dis-
establishing, creative power. 149 
For example: Among the Iroquois, it is said about the origin of the 
Five Nations confederation that the Great Upholder - Ta-ren-ya-wa-
gon, the Upholder of Heavens, the Upholder of Sky - heard the cries 
148. Polycentric jurisdiction is explored in Cover, supra note 1. 
On the case history and present possibilities of constitutional protection for groups, including 
tribes, see the creative work of Aviam Soifer in Soifer, Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, 
Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 Mo. L. REV. 350 (1989). (Soifer concludes: "Ifwe are to 
find the fragile material we need to pursue glimmerings of a better world, we must heed multi-
layered stories that help us form and pass on our identities together." Id. at 383.) 
By rethinking the notion of insiders and outsiders in the American story, Carol Weisbrod 
discerns multiple centers of authority, le., competing sovereignties. Weisbrod, Family, Church 
and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1988). She 
pursues "a pluralist analysis that posits multiple authorities and then examines their interactions 
over time," and she persuasively demonstrates how such an analysis is "useful in dealing with the 
history of American family law and, moreover, with the issue of religious authority in America's 
constitutional structure, a structure that sees not merely 'faction,' but also multiple authorities." 
Id. at 766 (footnotes omitted). 
If American constitutional law and the American story can be made to lie down together 
with the law and stories of Indians as well as of others, work like that of Cover, Soifer, and 
Weisbrod will surely be one of the reasons of success. 
149. The question is one of power: what power is and how it is invoked. The powers that be 
and that uphold the status quo are one type of power. Martin Luther King, Jr., did not have this 
kind of power. However, he did exercise and invoke power of another order, one that I identify 
in the text as "disestablishing, creative power." 
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of humans in flight from monsters. 150 He descended to earth and led 
the people to a safe place where they could be content. When they had 
grown fat, he enabled them to spread out and become great nations by 
dividing them into tribes. To each he gave a different tongue. 
"[T]heir language changed and they could no longer understand the 
rest of the people."151 The nations increased and prospered until fierce 
and pitiless strangers flooded down upon them from the north. The 
Great Upholder became a mortal and took the name Hiawatha. "He 
advised all the nations to assemble and wait his coming."152 They 
gathered by the shores of Lake Onondaga. Hiawatha and his daughter 
appeared in a gleaming white canoe, and when they stepped ashore 
"[h]e greeted all he met as brothers and spoke to each in his own lan-
guage."153 Suddenly they heard a great noise and out of the heavens 
came a bird to carry Hiawatha's daughter away. For three days Hia-
watha mourned in silence. Then he rose, called a council and advised 
the nations to "have one fire, one pipe, one war club." 154 They prom-
ised to follow his advice. "Thus with the help of Hiawatha, the Great 
Unifier, the mighty League of the Five Nations was born, and its tribes 
held sway undisturbed over the land between the great river of the 
west and the great sea of the east."155 The Tree of Peace was planted. 
Under its shelter other nations might join with the League, and all 
people be related. Hiawatha returned to his canoe which rose into the 
sky and disappeared in the clouds. 
According to the Book of Genesis, there was a time when "the 
whole earth had one language and few words,"156 and men built a city 
and a tower to make a name for themselves. God came down to see 
and concluded: "[T]hey are one people, and they have all one lan-
guage; and this is only the beginning of what they will do."157 And he 
confused their language that they might "not understand one an-
other's speech." 158 They were scattered, and the city's name "was 
called Babel, because there the Lord confused the language of all the 
150. For recently accessible versions, see Hiawatha the Unifier, in AMERICAN INDIAN 
MYTHS AND LEGENDS 193, 194 (R. Erdoes & A. Ortiz eds. 1984), and Arden, The Fire that 
Never Dies, NATL. GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1987, at 375, 380-82. 
151. Hiawatha the Unifier, supra note ISO, at 194. 
152. Id. at 196. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 197. 
155. Id. at 198. 
156. Genesis 11:1 (Revised Standard Version). 
157. Genesis 11:6. 
158. Genesis 11:7. 
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earth."159 According to the Book of Acts, when Jesus' chosen apostles 
"were looking on, he was lifted up, and a cloud took him out of their 
sight."160 Later, on the day of Pentecost, they heard a mighty wind 
from heaven, and "there appeared to them tongues as of fire, distrib-
uted and resting on each one of them. And they were all filled with 
the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues." 161 At the sound, 
"Jews, devout men from every nation under heaven ... came together, 
and they were bewildered, because each one heard them speaking in 
his own language,"162 telling in their "own tongues the mighty works 
of God." 163 
V. BEGINNING 
Narrative - and this is true of the American story of origins in 
particular - is a richly accommodating, productive medium but can 
be transcending only when it is the medium of transcendence, as sto-
ries themselves reveal. Native American and western biblical tradi-
tions differ, radically, in their description of the transcendent and yet 
converge upon the point that many voices with common understand-
ing - polyphony - is evidence that transcendence is present. Poly-
phony realized in politics - fully, authentically, externally as well as 
internally - bears witness not to the human imagination's aesthetic 
self-transformation through narrative but to the redemptive power of a 
beyond in the midst of our life.164 
In narrative as in the science of chaos, there is "sensitive depen-
dence upon initial conditions." 165 Beginnings are critical, as Douglass 
159. Genesis 11:9. 
160. Acts 1:9 (Revised Standard Version). 
161. Acts 2:3-4. 
162. Acts 2:5-6. 
163. Acts 2:11. 
164. Dietrich Bonhoeffer described God as "beyond in the midst of our life." D. BoNHOEF-
FER, LETIERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 155 (E. Bethge 3d ed. 1967). On the theological 
context of Bonhoeffer's formula and its possible bearing upon law, see M. BALL, LYING DOWN 
TOGETHER 126-38, 182 n.15, 191 n.5 (1985). 
Other forms besides narrative are also possible and effective media. For example, Emily 
Dickinson chose not to publish, but what she chose not to publish was lyric poetry rather than 
narrative. It can be argued that this was an act of resistance to the dominance of narrative 
expression. See Dickie, Dickinson's Discontinuous Lyric Self. 60 AM. LIT. 537 (1988). Other 
forms - like lyric - are possible and useful, but transcendence is still necessary if they are to be 
made media of transfiguration. 
165. J. GLEICK, CHAOS 23 (1987) (the notion quoted in the text is also known as "the Butter-
fly effect": a butterfly stirring the air in Beijing today can transform storm systems in New York 
next month). 
A distinction may be drawn between the beginning of a story and the beginning of the events 
narrated. A snapshot has edges (a beginning and an end), but the viewer knows that the events 
depicted began before and continued after the photograph was made. "Once upon a time" enjoys 
the uncomplicated ease of the snapshot as a way to slide into a story without straining over a 
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and Lincoln realized. In Greek (archt'e) and Latin (principium), the 
same word connotes both "principle" and "beginning." Principle be-
longs to theory, beginning to narrative. 
The Two Row Wampum does not press the issue of beginning. In 
one sense it does denote a beginning. The matrix of the belt is said to 
have been the first contact between Indians and Europeans. And after 
this initial intersection, the Indians and the recent immigrants would 
be linked: they would travel a common river. In the belt they are 
separated but also joined by three beads of wampum. A new reality, 
two vessels side by side, is set in motion. 
In another sense, however, the beginning is left open. The first and 
continuing contact is memorialized by two rows that never intersect 
and have no start or finish. The belt is a moment. It makes no fore-
closing statement about the beginning (or end) of the nonconverging 
rows. It leaves to the occupants of each vessel their own story of their 
origins and appends no supremacy clause to one story or the other. 
I tell and employ and participate in and try to improve and aug-
ment the American story of origins and shall continue to do so. But I 
also think the larger, more urgent vocation is obedience to the tran-
scendent who frees us for others, for the stories of others, and for re-
spect of their integrity - obedience to the Principium "for individual 
regeneration and for social reformation, the point of departure for a 
fresh experiment in human relationships, on the acceptance of which 
rests the only real hope of fulfilling the promise of secular life."166 
coincidence between the beginning of the story and the beginning of the events. The Book of 
Genesis illustrates a coincidence of beginnings ("In the beginning ..•. "). But even there the 
attempted coincidence is incomplete: What about the beginning of God who "in the beginning" 
created the heavens and the earth? Then, too, what in the Hebrew Bible is the story of origins? 
In note 2, supra, I cited the exodus rather than the creation as the story of origins. The calling of 
Abraham might also be said to constitute the story of origins. 
The Gospels of Mark, Luke, and John expressly raise and differently resolve the beginning. 
Another way to handle the beginning of the American story is to locate its origin in a biblical 
story. 
166. c. COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE 501 (1957). Cochrane's 
book is a thorough and imaginative account of Augustinian Christianity's argument with the 
Roman Empire that the latter had defective principia. 
Because principle and beginning are coeval, Hannah Arendt argued, the act of beginning is 
saved from arbitrariness. As she paraphrased Plato: "For the beginning, because it contains its 
own principle, is also a god who, as long as he dwells among men, as long as he inspires their 
deeds, saves everything." H. ARENDT, supra note 6, at 214. In the American republic, she said, 
the beginning was identical with the singular appearance of mutual promise and common delib· 
eration (or, as I would say, of equality and effective participation). Id. at 215. 
I think the American beginning was flawed or at least incomplete. Many were excluded. 
Among the excluded were the tribes whose exclusion from the beginning and the story of the 
beginning is irremediable. Blacks, too, were excluded. But they worked their way in. I do not 
mean that the inclusion of blacks has been accomplished in fact at the present. I do mean that 
the American story can scarcely be told now without including the fourteenth amendment and 
Brown v. Board of Education. For the tribes there is no equivalent to Brown. Women, too, were 
excluded. A revision of the American story so that it can be made to include women and/or an 
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altogether new story from the feminist perspective is at least as fundamental, necessary, and 
promising as the revisions or additions called for in the instance of blacks and Native Americans. 
The defect of the American beginning is, or so I presently believe, a particular instance of the 
general truth that beginnings generated by humans cannot save everything. To think them gods 
is to practice idolatry. 
My reference to a principium in the last sentence of the text is drawn from Saint Augustine's 
observation that, when Jesus was asked "who He was, He answered that he was the 
Princip[ium]." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF Goo 329 (M. Dods trans. 1950). Augustine con-
cluded "that Christ is the Princip[ium] by whose incarnation we are purified." Id. at 328. I 
need, sometime, to explore the notion of the biblical Principium as equipping us to accept the 
integrity of others' stories of origins. We can choose to take certain stories of origin as our own, 
as I choose those of the Bible. I do not understand such a choice to entail the rejection of the 
alternatives. Indeed, it seems to me to lead directly to respect and gratitude for them. Indian 
stories are not mine, but I am deeply affected by and thankful for them. Two vessels side by side 
sounds about right to me, the occupants of the one listening to those of the other without offering 
unsolicited steerage. 
I should only want to make sure that two-boat thinking does not become a new version of the 
two-sphere rhetoric that masks the operations of established power. The distinction between 
supposed public and private spheres is an example of such rhetoric. Two-boat thinking is not to 
be confused with or to become a surrogate for something like the apartheid practiced by South 
Africa or that version of it formerly entrenched in the American South. 
I am also mindful of the fact that two boats cannot mean an absence of interdependence. 
James Clifford has given us a thoughtful reminder that "[t)his ambiguous, multivocal world 
makes it increasingly hard to conceive of human diversity as inscribed in bounded, independent 
cultures. Difference is an effect of inventive syncretism." J. CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF 
CULTURE 23 (1988). 
